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SMITH, Chief Judge. 
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Decades after the filing of maritime asbestos injury 
cases in the Northern District of Ohio, the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania—which was by then presiding 
over a nationwide asbestos products multidistrict litigation 
(MDL)—dismissed claims against numerous defendants for 
lack of personal jurisdiction.  Unsurprisingly, the MDL Court’s 
opinions regarding personal jurisdiction, which were 
subsequently applied to thousands of claims, have prompted 
multiple appeals, including two prior appeals to this Court.  
Now, for the third time, we address on appeal the MDL Court’s 
personal jurisdiction rulings.  Based on the unique history of 
the three consolidated cases now on appeal, we again conclude 
that dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction was 
inappropriate.  We will dismiss in part and reverse in part. 
I. 
A. 
In the mid-1980s, merchant mariners filed thousands of 
lawsuits in the Northern District of Ohio against shipowners,1 
raising claims that the merchant mariners had been injured due 
to exposure to asbestos onboard ships.  Northern District of 
                                              
1 Many shipowner defendants and multiple defense 
firms have been involved in this litigation.  Unless otherwise 
indicated, when we describe actions taken by “defendants,” 
“shipowners,” and “defense counsel” in this Opinion, we are 
referring to appellees and their counsel at Thompson Hine LLP 
(previously Thompson, Hine & Flory).  
4 
 
Ohio Judge Thomas Lambros2 initially presided over the 
massive Ohio maritime asbestos docket (MARDOC) prior to 
the 1991 consolidation of the cases in an MDL in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.   
When they filed in the Northern District of Ohio, the 
merchant mariners relied on a theory of nationwide personal 
jurisdiction for maritime cases.  In 1989, shipowners filed 
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing 
that the nationwide theory of jurisdiction was improper and 
that they did not have sufficient ties to Ohio to justify the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over them.  In an oral ruling 
in October of 1989, Judge Lambros rejected the merchant 
mariners’ theory of jurisdiction and ruled that the Northern 
District of Ohio lacked personal jurisdiction over a number of 
the shipowners.3  Judge Lambros indicated, however, that he 
would be denying the motion to dismiss and issuing an order 
transferring the cases instead.  Following Judge Lambros’s 
ruling, defense counsel requested additional time to consult 
with his clients and determine whether the shipowners wanted 
to accept transfer or waive their personal jurisdiction defenses 
so that they could remain in the Northern District of Ohio.  
Counsel suggested that his clients may very well want to waive 
the defense:  “It is conceivable, your Honor, in view of the fact 
that such motions to dismiss have been denied that some of 
                                              
2 After over 27 years of distinguished service, Judge 
Lambros left the federal bench in 1995. 
3 The merchant mariners have since abandoned the 
nationwide contacts theory and do not appeal the MDL Court’s 
ruling that there was not personal jurisdiction over defendants. 
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those defendants who filed motions will not care to be 
transferred and they wish to stay here, I don’t know.  I have to 
consult with them.”  App. 291.   
The Northern District of Ohio followed up the next 
month with a hearing to address the shipowners’ decisions as 
to whether they would waive the personal jurisdiction defense.  
Defense counsel advised Judge Lambros that he did not yet 
have an answer because his clients wanted to know how Judge 
Lambros would rule on various issues prior to deciding 
whether they would consent to jurisdiction.  See, e.g., App. 
362–63.  Defense counsel explained that in his view “a lot of 
these people will stay once they know that information.”  App. 
364.  Counsel for the merchant mariners objected to the 
shipowners’ equivocation:  
And so [defense counsel] Mr. Murphy is saying 
well, he can’t make a decision.  And just like the 
old expression be careful what you ask for; you 
might get it.  That’s really what he has here.  He 
says, ‘Oh, Judge, we wanted to get out of here.’  
Then he says, ‘Well, we want you to make a few 
more preliminary rulings before we decide 
whether we want to go or not.’  I say get them 
out of here.  
App. 373; see also App. 378.  At the conclusion of the 
November hearing, the Northern District of Ohio directed the 
shipowners to simply file answers by the answer deadline if 
they intended to waive the personal jurisdiction objection, and, 
at the time, defense counsel accepted that procedure:   
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Judge Lambros: “What happens if in the 
management of these cases if we make the 
disclosure date the same date as the answer date, 
but if the position is that they are not leaving, 
they have to have their answers in on those 
dates?” 
*** 
Defense Counsel: “I see no problem with that, 
your Honor.  Now that we have the information, 
we know what we have to do, that’s no problem.”   
App. 401–02.4 
Judge Lambros issued MARDOC Orders No. 40 and 
41, on November 22, 1989, and December 29, 1989, 
                                              
4 See also App. 404 (Judge Lambros: “And unless of 
course the parties otherwise announce by January 5th, that then 
on January 6th or 7th these cases will be transferred. . . . But 
January 5th the answers have to be filed, and then we transfer 
then if those specific defendants don’t answer and thus waive 
by the answer date, then the cases get transferred out.”); App. 
404–05 (Judge Lambros: “In other words a transfer order goes 
on and we designate the particular jurisdictions to which it will 
be transferred, and that order will go into effect January 7th 
unless by January 5th those particular defendants choose to 
waive the in personam jurisdiction problem . . . Mr. Murphy: I 
don’t perceive any difficulty.  Special Master Martyn: Just for 
my understanding, so they will answer if they want to stay.  
[Judge Lambros]: That’s right.”). 
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respectively, reiterating the procedure announced at the 
November hearing and directing shipowners who wished to 
waive their personal jurisdiction defenses to file answers by 
January 5, 1990, in order to demonstrate waiver.  See App. 416 
(MARDOC 40: “Parties who, upon reconsideration of their 
motions to dismiss or transfer, wish to remain in this 
jurisdiction need only file answers to the complaints in 
accordance with the deadlines established below.”); App. 419 
(MARDOC 41: “Shipowner defendants, not subject to this 
transfer order, shall file answers by January 5, 1990.”).  
MARDOC Order 41 expressly ordered transfer of the cases 
where there was no personal jurisdiction and identified the 
jurisdiction to which each case would be transferred.  On 
December 29, 1989, shipowners filed a motion for 
interlocutory appeal and stay to challenge the Northern District 
of Ohio’s authority to transfer the cases rather than dismissing 
them.   
Before the Northern District of Ohio had ruled on the 
motion for interlocutory appeal and stay, all shipowners 
relevant to this consolidated appeal filed answers on January 5, 
1990, in compliance with Judge Lambros’s deadline.  Yet 
shipowners asserted in those answers that they were filing 
under protest and continued to assert personal jurisdiction 
defenses.  App. 1131; App. 1133–34; App. 1136.  Other 
defendants did not file answers and were transferred out of the 
Northern District of Ohio. 
After the shipowners filed their answers, the Northern 
District of Ohio proceeded as if they had waived their personal 
jurisdiction defenses.  MARDOC Order 41, directing transfer 
of those cases where personal jurisdiction was lacking, was 
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never effectuated as to these shipowners.5  Nor did the 
Northern District of Ohio rule on the motion for interlocutory 
appeal.  Indeed, the cases progressed before Judge Lambros for 
over a year, with no additional motion practice challenging the 
Northern District of Ohio’s jurisdiction or seeking transfer.6   
B. 
In 1991, authority over the maritime asbestos cases was 
transferred to the asbestos MDL in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  Defendants opposed transfer to the MDL Court 
                                              
5 There are indications in the record that other cases, in 
which an answer was not filed, were actually transferred.  See, 
e.g., App. 465–66 (“As a consequence of this Honorable 
Court’s Order of December 10, 1989, forum non conveniens 
plagues plaintiffs, for each of the causes of action has been 
splintered, leaving part of the case here and part elsewhere.”); 
App. 482. 
6 In February 1990, merchant mariners moved for 
transfer in toto of the cases such that they could all be tried in 
one jurisdiction.  Defense counsel for the shipowners relevant 
to this appeal filed a brief opposing transfer and noting that 
some shipowners had waived their personal jurisdiction 
defenses in order to proceed in the Northern District of Ohio.  
Those waiver statements were not directly tied to any specific 
shipowner.  Similarly, a group of cases was temporarily 
transferred to Michigan and defense counsel argued for 
retransfer back to the Northern District of Ohio, arguing in part 
that those shipowners had waived their personal jurisdiction 
defenses in Ohio.  The cases now on appeal were not part of 
the Michigan group, as explained infra. 
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but did not raise a personal jurisdiction defense in their 
opposition papers.  After the creation of the MDL, the 
MARDOC cases were stayed.  There is no dispute, however, 
that the shipowners consistently attempted to raise personal 
jurisdiction defenses in compliance with the MDL timelines.   
In 2011, the cases at issue here were reactivated by 
Judge Robreno, who by then was presiding over the MDL in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  In 2013 and 2014, the 
MDL Court issued two memorandum opinions concluding that 
a number of shipowners were not subject to personal 
jurisdiction in Ohio and that the shipowners had not waived the 
defense.  The MDL Court explained that the shipowners had 
preserved the defense by raising lack of personal jurisdiction 
before the Northern District of Ohio and again before the MDL 
Court on multiple occasions.  Although shipowners filed 
answers in the Northern District of Ohio—a procedure Judge 
Lambros had ordered would indicate waiver—the MDL Court 
concluded that this did not result in waiver because 
“defendants did not intend to waive the defense.” App. 53.  The 
MDL Court noted that “defendants faced a Hobson’s choice: 
they could either have agreed to a transfer of the cases to 
another jurisdiction (and thus lost the ability to assert cross-
claims against manufacturer defendants), or they could have 
chosen to remain in the Northern District of Ohio and lost the 
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.”  App. 54.  
Accordingly, the MDL Court held that “[b]y filing answers 
which clearly identified the defense, while at the same time 
seeking interlocutory review of Judge Lambros’[s] order, 
defendants preserved and did not waive the defense.”  App. 54 
(internal citation omitted).  The MDL Court subsequently 
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applied its prior memorandum opinions to the three merchant 
mariners relevant to this appeal and dismissed their claims 
against the shipowners for lack of personal jurisdiction.  
Merchant mariners Munnier, Schroeder, and Williams filed a 
timely notice of appeal.   
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1333.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.7  See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 
294, 308–09 (1962). 
                                              
7 The clerk’s office sua sponte ordered the parties to 
brief whether the MDL Court’s order was a final order such 
that this Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Following a review of the parties’ briefs, we 
have no doubt that the MDL Court’s order was an appealable 
final order.  See Allegheny Int’l, Inc. v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel 
Corp., 920 F.2d 1127, 1131 (3d Cir. 1990) (“A district court’s 
decision is final and appealable for purposes of § 1291 only 
when the decision ends the litigation on the merits and leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  While the MDL Court indicated in 
its judgment that it was transferring the cases to the 
bankruptcy-only docket for plaintiffs to pursue claims against 
bankrupt defendants, there was clear “indicia of finality.”  In 
addition, the MDL Court elsewhere described the “transfer” to 
the bankruptcy docket as a “dismissal.”  See, e.g., In re 
Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig., No. 2:02-md-875, Dkt. 4961 
at 2 (directing plaintiffs to identify whether cases “can be 
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We must, nonetheless, dismiss Mr. Schroeder’s appeal 
against Marine Transport Lines, Inc., because it is barred by 
res judicata.  After the MDL Court dismissed Mr. Schroeder’s 
claims, but before a final judgment had issued, Mr. Schroeder 
filed suit in South Carolina state court raising the same claims 
against Marine Transport Lines.  After the state court 
dismissed similar cases brought by other plaintiffs because 
they were filed outside of the statute of limitations, Mr. 
Schroeder, apparently anticipating the state court’s ruling, filed 
a motion to voluntarily dismiss his claims.  The state court 
entered an order dismissing Mr. Schroeder’s claims with 
prejudice.   
This Court gives a judgment of a state court the same 
preclusive effect as would another court of that state.  
Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 141 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  In South Carolina, “[a] dismissal with prejudice 
acts as an adjudication on the merits and therefore precludes 
subsequent litigation just as if the action had been tried to a 
final adjudication.”  Laughon v. O’Braitis, 602 S.E.2d 108, 111 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2004).  Accordingly, the South Carolina 
dismissal with prejudice precludes Mr. Schroeder and his 
estate from pursuing claims against Marine Transport Lines.  
                                              
marked closed or dismissed to the ‘bankruptcy only’ docket” 
(emphasis added)); see also Johnston v. Citizens Bank & Trust 
Co. of Flippin, Ark., 659 F.2d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding 
that a District Court judgment was a final judgment despite the 
fact that portions of the case were “transferred” to the 
Bankruptcy Court because it was clear that those portions of 
the case had actually been dismissed). 
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We will therefore grant the motion to dismiss Mr. Schroeder’s 
appeal as to Marine Transport Lines. 
III. 
We review a District Court’s decision as to the waiver 
of an affirmative defense for abuse of discretion.  Sharp v. 
Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 158 (3d Cir. 2012).  “A court abuses 
its discretion when its decision rests upon a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper 
application of law to fact.”  Id. at 158 n.19 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Here, the fundamental facts are not in dispute.  
Instead, the primary question at issue is whether the 
defendants’ conduct amounted to waiver of the personal 
jurisdiction defense as a matter of law.  We hold that the 
District Court’s conclusion that there was no waiver was an 
improper application of law to fact that constitutes an abuse of 
discretion under this Court’s precedent. 
A. 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), 
defendants have the right to move for dismissal for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, but that right is not unlimited.  Rule 12(h) 
clarifies that the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction can be 
waived if a defendant fails to raise it in a timely fashion.  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(h).  Precedent of the Supreme Court and this 
Court further holds that the right to assert a personal 
jurisdiction defense can be affirmatively and implicitly waived 
through conduct.  See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. 
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982) 
(“Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents 
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first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be 
waived.”); Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1969) 
(“[P]ersonal jurisdiction may be conferred by consent of the 
parties, expressly or by failure to object.” (citing Petrowski v. 
Hawkeye Security Ins. Co., 350 U.S. 495, 496 (1956))).   
Simply put, “[t]he actions of the defendant may amount 
to a legal submission to the jurisdiction of the court” even 
where a defendant has raised the defense.  Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 
Ltd., 456 U.S. at 704–05; see also Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 
539 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Asserting a jurisdictional defect in the 
answer did not preserve the defense in perpetuity.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  This aligns with the original 
purpose of Rule 12, which is to prevent “dilatory tactics” and 
“to expedite and simplify the pretrial phase of federal 
litigation” to facilitate adjudication on the merits.  5B C. 
Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Prac. and Proc. § 1342 (3d ed. 
2004). 
Thus, even where a party has met the technical 
requirements of Rule 12(h), that is not always sufficient to 
avoid waiver.  See Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 
1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Rule 12(h)(1) specifies the 
minimum steps that a party must take in order to preserve a 
defense.”).  A party’s actions must also be consistent with the 
spirit of Rule 12 by diligently advancing its procedural 
objections.  See Yeldell, 913 F.2d at 539 (“While the Tutts 
literally complied with Rule 12(h) by including the 
jurisdictional issue in their answer, they did not comply with 
the spirit of the rule, which is to expedite and simplify 
proceedings in the Federal Courts.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  As this Court has explained, “a party is deemed to 
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have consented to personal jurisdiction if the party actually 
litigates the underlying merits or demonstrates a willingness to 
engage in extensive litigation in the forum.”  In re Tex. E. 
Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 
15 F.3d 1230, 1236 (3d Cir. 1994).  “In particular, where a 
party seeks affirmative relief from a court, it normally submits 
itself to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the 
adjudication of claims arising from the same subject matter.”  
Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 
1999) (citing Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67 (1938)).   
B. 
Here, there is no dispute that the shipowners timely filed 
a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in the 
Northern District of Ohio, in compliance with Rule 12.  The 
question is therefore whether the MDL Court abused its 
discretion when it concluded that the shipowners had not 
waived their personal jurisdiction defenses by subsequently 
consenting to, or acquiescing in, the jurisdiction of the 
Northern District of Ohio. 
This Court has issued two non-precedential opinions in 
related cases where other merchant mariners appealed the 
MDL Court’s orders dismissing maritime asbestos cases for 
lack of personal jurisdiction.  See In re: Asbestos Prod. Liab. 
Litig. (No. VI) (Braun), 661 F. App’x 173 (3d Cir. 2016); In re 
Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI) (Blue), 721 F. App’x 111 
(3d Cir. 2017).8  In both cases, this Court reversed, concluding 
                                              
8 These dispositions were not opinions of the full Court 
and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 do not constitute binding precedent. 
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that the shipowners had waived their personal jurisdiction 
defenses.  Those appeals, however, involved cases that had 
been transferred from the Northern District of Ohio to 
Michigan, whereas the cases here had not been transferred.  
The panels relied on express statements by shipowners in the 
Michigan proceedings that they had waived their personal 
jurisdiction defenses in Ohio.  We decline the merchant 
mariners’ invitation to impute the shipowners’ statements in 
Braun and Blue to defendants here.9  There was no express 
waiver in the three cases before us.   
The question, then, becomes whether the MDL Court 
abused its discretion when it concluded that the shipowners had 
not implicitly waived their personal jurisdiction defenses 
through their conduct in the Northern District of Ohio.  We 
conclude that the facts and our precedent support a 
determination that there was implicit waiver.  We hold, 
therefore, that the MDL Court’s contrary ruling was an abuse 
of discretion. 
First, the shipowners themselves introduced the 
possibility of waiver at the October 1989 hearing by asking for 
additional time so they could choose whether to assent to 
transfer or waive their personal jurisdiction objections.  Then, 
at the hearing the following month, the shipowners 
equivocated as to whether or not they intended to waive the 
                                              
9 We do note, however, that at the time defense counsel 
stated in the Michigan cases that the personal jurisdiction 
defense had previously been waived, nothing had transpired in 
those cases to indicate waiver apart from the conduct that had 
also taken place in the cases here.   
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defense, and their counsel requested that Judge Lambros make 
additional rulings before his clients decided whether to waive 
jurisdiction.  Generally, a party who requests affirmative relief 
and rulings from a court is considered to have waived the 
personal jurisdiction defense.  Bel-Ray Co., 181 F.3d at 443.   
Second, the record is clear that the shipowners objected 
to transfer, and they stand by that objection on appeal.  See, 
e.g., Appellees’ Br. at 39 (“Appellees declined either to waive 
their defenses or to assent to transfer.”).  Because Judge 
Lambros had already denied defendants’ motions to dismiss 
and concluded that personal jurisdiction was absent, the 
shipowners were left with two options.  They could waive their 
personal jurisdiction defenses and remain in the Northern 
District of Ohio, or they could submit to transfer to a court 
where personal jurisdiction existed.  By objecting to transfer, 
the shipowners constructively opted to waive their personal 
jurisdiction defenses.   
Third, we conclude that the shipowners unequivocally 
waived their personal jurisdiction defenses when they filed 
answers in the Northern District of Ohio.  Generally, filing an 
answer in which lack of personal jurisdiction is identified as an 
affirmative defense would not constitute waiver.  The 
circumstances of this case, however, require a different result.  
Judge Lambros and the parties expressly agreed that the 
shipowners could demonstrate waiver of the defense by filing 
an answer no later than January 5, 1990, and that shipowners 
not subject to personal jurisdiction who did not file an answer 
would be transferred to a court with personal jurisdiction over 
them.  App. 401–05.  Defense counsel indicated an 
understanding of, and agreement to, this procedure.  App. 402, 
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405.  Accordingly, when the shipowners then filed answers in 
compliance with the agreed-upon procedure, their actions were 
consistent with waiver, despite the fact that they purported to 
preserve the personal jurisdiction defense.  Behavior that is 
consistent with waiver, and which indicates an intent to litigate 
the case on the merits, is sufficient to constitute waiver, 
regardless of whether the parties also express an intent to 
preserve the defense.  See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 456 U.S. 
at 704–05; In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp. PCB 
Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 15 F.3d at 1236.   
Further, to the extent the shipowners believed they had 
a basis for pursuing an interlocutory appeal regarding the 
validity of Judge Lambros’s order denying dismissal and 
instead ordering transfer, they had already filed a motion to 
stay pending resolution of that appeal and could have relied on 
that motion or, if necessary, filed a petition for writ of 
mandamus.  They were under no obligation to file answers in 
order to avoid immediate transfer or otherwise, as they were 
not bound by the scheduling orders of a court that did not have 
jurisdiction over them.  Cf. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 
706 (“A defendant is always free to ignore the judicial 
proceedings, risk a default judgment, and then challenge that 
judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral 
proceeding.”).  By filing pleadings responding to substantive 
allegations in the merchant mariners’ complaints—after Judge 
Lambros had unequivocally ruled that he did not have 
jurisdiction—the shipowners chose to actively litigate their 
cases.  The shipowners were fully aware that their conduct 
constituted waiver in the eyes of plaintiffs and Judge Lambros, 
and created an expectation of continued litigation on the 
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merits.  See In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp. PCB 
Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 15 F.3d at 1236; see also 
Mobile Anesthesiologists Chicago, LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. 
Houston Metroplex, P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2010).  
We conclude the conduct here constitutes waiver. 
Fourth, even if the shipowners had not waived their 
personal jurisdiction defenses by filing answers or through 
other conduct consistent with waiver, they subsequently 
forfeited the defense by failing to diligently pursue it in the 
Northern District of Ohio.  See United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (“Whereas forfeiture is the failure to 
make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  As indicated by the ongoing 
proceedings, Judge Lambros must have believed that the 
shipowners had waived the defense because he continued to 
preside over the cases, despite his prior ruling that the Northern 
District of Ohio did not have personal jurisdiction, and he did 
not transfer the cases despite the fact that the defendants were 
clearly subject to MARDOC Order 41.  If the shipowners had 
not intended to waive their defenses by filing answers and 
believed that the Northern District of Ohio continued to lack 
personal jurisdiction over them, they had an obligation to 
diligently pursue that defense rather than acquiesce in the 
ongoing Northern District of Ohio proceedings.  See In re Tex. 
E. Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage 
Litig., 15 F.3d at 1236.  The shipowners’ failure to do so 
constituted forfeiture.  See Hamilton v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 197 
F.3d 58, 59 (2d Cir. 1999) (“We conclude that Atlas forfeited 
its defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by participating in 
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extensive pretrial proceedings and forgoing numerous 
opportunities to move to dismiss during the four-year interval 
that followed its inclusion of the defense in its answer.”). 
Based on these grounds, it is clear that defendants both 
waived their personal jurisdiction defenses through their own 
affirmative conduct in the Northern District of Ohio and 
forfeited their personal jurisdiction defenses by subsequently 
failing to pursue them in that Court.  It was an abuse of 
discretion for the MDL Court to conclude otherwise given the 
proceedings before Judge Lambros and the shipowners’ 
undisputed conduct in the Northern District of Ohio.   
Further, the MDL Court abused its discretion by 
applying incorrect legal standards.  First, the MDL Court 
improperly concluded that the shipowners had preserved the 
personal jurisdiction defense simply by stating in their answers 
that they did not intend to waive it.  The law is clear that words 
alone are insufficient to preserve a personal jurisdiction 
defense where conduct indicates waiver.  And defendants can 
forfeit the defense even through conduct that is involuntary.  
See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 456 U.S. at 704–05.  Although 
the District Court accurately cited this law, it did not apply it 
correctly to the facts of this case.   
Second, the MDL Court explained that the shipowners 
faced a “Hobson’s choice” in deciding whether to answer and 
waive personal jurisdiction or agree to transfer, App. 54, and 
the MDL Court suggested that being forced to make a choice 
was somehow inappropriate.  But defendants always face such 
a choice when a court lacks personal jurisdiction and rules in 
favor of transfer rather than dismissal.  The shipowners did not 
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have the right to simultaneously maintain their personal 
jurisdiction defenses in the Northern District of Ohio and avoid 
transfer to a court with personal jurisdiction over them.  To the 
extent the MDL Court concluded that a defendant should not 
be required to choose between waiver of the personal 
jurisdiction defense and transfer, that was legal error.   
Based on the MDL Court’s application of incorrect 
legal standards and its improper application of the waiver 
standard to the factual history of these cases, we will reverse. 
C. 
Notably, the Sixth Circuit has affirmed the MDL 
Court’s order dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction in an 
appeal by plaintiffs who share the same procedural history as 
the parties here.  See Kalama v. Matson Navigation Co., 875 
F.3d 297 (6th Cir. 2017).  Like the MDL Court, the Sixth 
Circuit concluded that Judge Lambros did not have the 
authority to institute a procedure whereby filing an answer 
would constitute waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense.  
We conclude that the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning is not 
persuasive given both our precedent and what we understand 
to have transpired in Judge Lambros’s courtroom.  For that 
reason, we are constrained not to follow the Sixth Circuit’s 
holdings. 
The Sixth Circuit explained that the Kalama defendants 
did not waive their personal jurisdiction defenses by filing 
answers because Judge Lambros exceeded his authority by 
declaring that filing an answer would result in waiver:   
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Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do 
not authorize a district court to strip a defendant 
of its right to assert an affirmative defense in an 
answer, it was not an abuse of discretion to 
determine that the ship-owner defendants could 
seek to preserve their personal-jurisdiction 
defense at that time.   
Id. at 305.  We disagree.  While it would ordinarily be 
appropriate for a defendant to raise a personal jurisdiction 
defense in an answer and thereby preserve the defense, the 
procedural history of this case was anything but typical.  Prior 
to the filing of answers, Judge Lambros had already ruled that 
he did not have personal jurisdiction over the shipowners.  
They could not continue to participate in the lawsuit and, 
simply by stating they were not waiving, preserve a defense 
that had already been ruled upon. 
Thus, Judge Lambros did not “strip a defendant of its 
right to assert an affirmative defense in an answer.”  Instead, 
having already ruled that he did not have personal jurisdiction 
over the shipowners, he ruled that continuing to actively 
litigate the case by submitting an answer would indicate waiver 
and an intent to proceed in the Northern District of Ohio.  That 
procedure was an exercise in case management that was 
entirely within Judge Lambros’s discretion.  See United States 
v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 217 (3d Cir. 2007); In re Fine Paper 
Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982) (“We will not 
interfere with a trial court’s control of its docket except upon 
the clearest showing that the procedures have resulted in actual 
and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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The Sixth Circuit further explained that the MDL Court 
did not abuse its discretion by concluding that there was no 
forfeiture because there was no concrete evidence of forfeiture: 
“On this record and absent concrete evidence that any specific 
ship-owner defendant had abandoned its personal-jurisdiction 
defense, it was not a clear error of judgment for the MDL court 
to reject the MARDOC plaintiffs’ forfeiture argument.”  
Kalama, 875 F.3d at 307.  As discussed above, we agree that 
there was no express waiver by the defendants here, but our 
precedent does not require concrete evidence or even an intent 
to waive or forfeit.  Conduct consistent with waiver or 
forfeiture is enough.  See, e.g., In re Tex. E. Transmission 
Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 15 F.3d at 
1236; Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 456 U.S. at 704–05.  Here, 
the shipowners objected to transfer, requested additional 
rulings from the Northern District of Ohio, complied with 
Judge Lambros’s procedure for waiving their personal 
jurisdiction defenses, and continued to participate in the 
litigation for over a year after Judge Lambros unequivocally 
ruled that he did not have personal jurisdiction.  That conduct 
establishes both waiver and forfeiture under this Circuit’s 
jurisprudence.  Accordingly, we must chart a different course 
than the Sixth Circuit followed in Kalama.   
“While we are generally reluctant to create circuit splits, 
we do so where a compelling basis exists.” Parker v. 
Montgomery Cty. Corr. Facility/Bus. Office Manager, 870 
F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 
F.3d 61, 75 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017)).  To the extent our holding today 
creates a circuit split with the Sixth Circuit, it is compelled by 
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our own precedent.  Yet even if we had discretion to depart 
from this Court’s case law and reconcile our ruling with that of 
the Sixth Circuit, we would still conclude that the compelling 
interests of promoting adjudication on the merits and 
permitting the merchant mariners to have their day in court are 
sufficient to justify a circuit split in this instance.  See, e.g., 
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466–67 (1962); 
Schwilm v. Holbrook, 661 F.2d 12, 16 (3d Cir. 1981); Myers v. 
Am. Dental Ass’n, 695 F.2d 716, 721 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[The 
Rule 12(h) waiver rule] reflects a strong policy against tardily 
raising defenses that go not to the merits of the case but to the 
legal adequacy of the initial steps taken by the plaintiff in his 
litigation, namely his service of process on the defendant and 
his choice of forum for the action.”). 
IV. 
For the reasons outlined above, we will grant 
shipowners’ motion to dismiss Mr. Schroeder and his estate’s 
appeal as to Marine Transports Lines, Inc.  We will otherwise 
reverse the MDL Court’s judgment and the orders granting the 
shipowners’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction as they pertain to these merchant mariners.  While 
the shipowner defendants did not expressly waive their 
personal jurisdiction defenses, their conduct in the Northern 
District of Ohio resulted in both waiver and forfeiture of those 
defenses.  It was, therefore, an abuse of discretion for the MDL 
Court to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Barring any 
additional preliminary matters, these 30-year-old cases should 
at last proceed to adjudication on the merit. 
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IN RE: ASBESTOS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION 
(NO. VI) 
No. 17-3471 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
Like buried treasure, the Appellant merchant mariners 
ask us to dig up court transcripts and interpret the meaning of 
off-the-cuff dialogue between counsel and the court that 
occurred more than three decades ago.  However, the MDL 
Court already accomplished this task, and it did so according 
to the appropriate legal standards and within the bounds of 
reasonable factual interpretation.  Because the record 
demonstrates that the MDL Court did not abuse its discretion 
in concluding that the shipowners preserved their personal 
jurisdiction defense, I would affirm.  
I 
After determining that the Northern District of Ohio did 
not have personal jurisdiction over certain defendants, Judge 
Lambros allowed defense counsel thirty days to consult with 
their clients regarding whether they would prefer to consent to 
jurisdiction in Ohio, or have their matter transferred to a court 
with jurisdiction. 
At the hearing that followed, Special Master Martyn, 
who managed MARDOC, stated that the court would “assume 
transfer” if defendants’ responses were not received by 
December 1, 1989.  App. at 331.  Special Master Martyn 
ordered that, if a party wished to waive jurisdiction, it must so 
“apprise the Court no later than Friday, December 1st, in 
writing.”  App. at 332.  Later in the hearing, he reiterated that 
any defendant wishing to waive jurisdiction must affirmatively 
do so in writing.   
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When Judge Lambros arrived at the hearing, defense 
counsel raised concerns about deciding whether to waive 
jurisdiction without additional information, such as the specific 
transferee courts and whether the cases would be consolidated.  
The court acknowledged defendants’ interest in answers to 
these questions, but noted that it could not yet make a ruling.  
The judge then proposed that “the disclosure date [be] the same 
date as the answer date, but if the position is that they are not 
leaving, they have to have their answers in on [January 5, 
1990].”  App. at 401-02.  In response, a representative of 
defense counsel stated that he “saw no problem with that.”  
App. at 402.  To clarify Judge Lambros’ position, Special 
Master Martyn asked, “[S]o they will answer if they want to 
stay[?] . . . And we will pull their name off the [transfer] list.”  
App. at 405.  Judge Lambros confirmed. 
The next day, the court issued MARDOC Order No. 40, 
which required the merchant mariners to list the forum to 
which each case should be transferred and noted that “[p]arties 
who, upon reconsideration of their motions to dismiss or 
transfer, wish to remain in this jurisdiction need only file 
answers to the complaints.”  App. at 416.  One week before the 
deadline to file answers, Judge Lambros issued MARDOC 
Order No. 41, which identified the defendants and cases not in 
the court’s jurisdiction and identified the jurisdictions to which 
the cases would be transferred.  
The shipowners, who were named in MARDOC Order 
No. 41 and all represented by the same firm, filed answers on 
January 5.  In Master Answer No. 1, they stated as an 
affirmative defense that “[t]he Court lacks personal jurisdiction 
due to insufficient contacts . . . .”  App. at 1131.  Master 
Answer No. 2 began with a preliminary statement specifically 
asserting that, by filing the answer, defendants were not 
waiving their personal jurisdiction defense: 
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In response to defendants’ motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court has issued 
MARDOC Order Nos. 40 and 41 which transfer 
the numerous cases against defendant to multiple 
jurisdictions, up to and including thirteen 
separate districts around the nation.  Each 
defendant maintains that the transfers are 
contrary to law.  A motion to certify the order of 
transfer for interlocutory appeal has been filed on 
behalf of defendant, and in order to preserve the 
status quo pending appellate review of such 
order, defendant files its answer to the 
complaints as directed by MARDOC Order Nos. 
40 and 41 under protest, so that said cases will 
not be transferred automatically pursuant to 
MARDOC Order No. 40 prior to completion of 
appellate review. By filing its answer, defendant 
specifically does not waive its defense of lack of 
personal jurisdiction or waive its objections to 
the propriety of the transfers. 
App. at 1133-34. 
Over the next year, the court’s only actions pertained to 
transferring cases.  For instance, because MARDOC Order No. 
41 would transfer the cases all over the United States and 
splinter cases across jurisdictions due to the numerous 
defendants in each action, the merchant mariners filed a motion 
to transfer in toto.  Defendants, including the shipowners, 
objected, however, stating in part that: 
Several nonresident defendants, although not 
subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court, 
nevertheless agreed to waive their personal 
jurisdiction defense as the quid pro quo to avoid 
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the expense of litigating these cases in as many 
as 13 different jurisdictions simultaneously, and 
to take advantage of the consolidated handling 
available in [the Northern District of Ohio]. 
App. at 474-75.   
Though defendants’ opposition noted that “several 
nonresident defendants” purposefully waived their personal 
jurisdiction defense, it did not identify who those defendants 
were. On appeal, the shipowners maintain that these statements 
“refer[] solely to nonresident defendants who were not clients 
of Thompson Hine and Flory, and are not Appellees here.”  
Appellees’ Br. at 17 (emphasis in original).  Instead, they 
explain that these statements refer to defendants represented by 
other firms who informed the court that they would “just as 
soon be [in Ohio] as anywhere,” filed motions consenting to 
the court’s jurisdiction, and withdrew their motions to dismiss 
or transfer.  Id. at 17-18. 
The court ultimately denied the merchant mariners’ 
Motion to Transfer in Toto.  However, Judge Lambros never 
ruled on defendants’ motion to certify interlocutory appeal of 
Order No. 41, nor did he transfer any cases pursuant to that 
Order, including those in which the defendants did not file 
answers.  Instead, in January of 1991, the court transferred 
forty-four cases, not including the shipowners’ cases at issue 
here, to the Eastern District of Michigan, while the shipowners’ 
cases (among others) remained on the Northern District of 
Ohio’s docket.  The Michigan cases were ultimately returned 
to Ohio, but it was not long before the Judicial Panel for 
Multidistrict Litigation transferred all asbestos cases, from 
jurisdictions across the United States, to the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania for consolidated pre-trial proceedings. 
There, the cases remained static for the next two 
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decades until Judge Robreno began presiding over MARDOC.  
At this time, the shipowners re-raised their motions to dismiss 
for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the MDL Court 
granted; the merchant mariners now appeal.  
II 
To reverse the lower court’s ruling, we must conclude 
that the MDL Court abused its discretion in determining that 
the shipowners preserved their personal jurisdiction defense.  
See Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 158 (3d Cir. 2012).  Such 
an abuse occurs where the court’s “decision rests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an 
improper application of law to fact.”  Id. at 158 n.19 (internal 
quotations omitted).   
The majority concludes “that the District Court’s 
conclusion that there was no waiver was an improper 
application of law to fact that constitutes an abuse of 
discretion.”  Maj. Op. at § III.  In reaching this holding, the 
majority also made a factual conclusion that “the shipowners 
were fully aware that [filing answers] constituted waiver in the 
eyes of the plaintiffs and Judge Lambros[] and created an 
expectation of continued litigation on the merits.” Maj. Op. at 
§ III(B). However, these conclusions overlook the significant 
deference afforded to the MDL Court’s findings and 
incorporate arguments that were not raised by the merchant 
mariners on appeal.1   
                                              
1 Only where the lower court’s “error is so ‘plain’ that manifest 
injustice would otherwise result” should an appellate court 
exercise its discretion to consider arguments that were not 
properly raised in the appellant’s opening brief.  Gambino v 
Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 169 (3d Cir. 1998).  There is no evidence 
to suggest that the lower court committed an error so egregious 
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A. The MDL Court Did Not Make Clearly Erroneous 
Finding of Fact. 
Though the majority does not expressly state that the 
MDL Court made clearly erroneous findings of fact, it reaches 
different factual conclusions than the MDL Court to find that 
the shipowners waived their jurisdictional defense.  In so 
doing, the majority applies a less deferential standard than that 
required.  The “clearly erroneous” standard “does not envision 
an appellate court substituting its findings for that of the district 
court; rather it allows only an assessment of whether there is 
enough evidence on record to support such findings, regardless 
[of] whether different inferences could be drawn.”  Leeper v. 
United States, 756 F.2d 300, 308 (3d Cir. 1985); see also 
Agathos v. Starlite Motel, 977 F.2d 1500, 1504 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(highlighting that a finding of fact is only “clearly erroneous” 
if the record lacks sufficient evidence to support the court’s 
factual conclusions). 
First, the majority holds that the shipowners waived 
their jurisdiction defense by filing answers; however, those 
answers included clear and unequivocal statements preserving 
their jurisdictional defenses in accordance with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and our law.  
This Court has held that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure permit “a defendant to answer to the merits in the 
same pleading in which he raises a jurisdictional defense 
without waiving the jurisdictional defense.”  Neifeld v. 
Steinberg, 438 F.2d 423, 427 (3d Cir. 1971).  In Neifeld, 
defendant filed an answer to plaintiff’s claims asserting a lack 
of personal jurisdiction and—in the same pleading—raising a 
                                              
that a “manifest injustice” would occur if we did not consider 
these un-argued issues.   
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counterclaim against plaintiff.  Id.  Plaintiff argued that, by 
filing a counterclaim, defendant submitted to the jurisdiction 
of the court.  Id. at 425.  On appeal, this Court noted that, 
though the Federal Rules do not explicitly authorize a party to 
couple a counterclaim and jurisdictional defense without 
waiving the jurisdictional defense, the language of Rule 12(b) 
does so implicitly.  Id. at 427-28.  This Court reasoned that, 
because Rule 12(b) permits a defendant to raise jurisdictional 
defenses by motion or answer, prohibiting the defendant from 
coupling his answer and counterclaim would invalidate the 
options expressly permitted by the Federal Rules, which the 
court cannot do.  Id. at 428.   
Relying on similar reasoning, the Sixth Circuit, 
reviewing cases from the same MDL Court as here, held that 
defendants did not waive personal jurisdiction by filing an 
answer, even in light of MARDOC Order No. 41.  Kalama v. 
Matson Navigation Co., 875 F.3d 297, 305 (6th Cir. 2017).  
The Kalama Court reasoned that because the Rules “do not 
authorize a district court to strip a defendant of its right to assert 
an affirmative defense in an answer, it was not an abuse of 
discretion to determine that the ship-owner defendants could 
seek to preserve their jurisdictional defense at any time.”  Id.  
It further concluded that the defendants’ preservation of their 
jurisdictional defense in Master Answer No. 2, the same 
Master Answer filed by the shipowners here, negated any 
inference that Judge Lambros’ order was an “ultimatum” 
requiring all answers to be interpreted as a waiver.  Id.  
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that the MDL Court did not 
8 
 
abuse its discretion in granting the motion to dismiss.2  Id. at 
308. 
The merchant mariners argue, and the majority 
concludes, that the shipowners waived their jurisdictional 
defense by filing an answer in light of Judge Lambros’ order.  
That reading, however, does not align with this Court’s ruling 
in Neifeld, where we declined to permit a procedurally proper 
option—objecting to jurisdiction in the answer itself—to be 
taken away from a defendant.  438 F.2d at 428.  Judge Lambros 
did not have the authority to order that filing an answer alone 
constituted waiver, because such an order would violate the 
Federal Rules. 
Second, the majority “conclude[s] that the shipowners 
unequivocally waived their personal jurisdiction defenses 
when they filed answers in the Northern District of Ohio” 
because “Judge Lambros and the parties expressly agreed that 
the shipowners could demonstrate waiver of the defense by 
filing an answer.” Maj. Op. at § III(B).  To support its holding, 
the majority references Judge Lambros’ statement that, “unless 
of course the parties otherwise announce” their intention to 
waive jurisdiction, the cases not under the court’s jurisdiction 
“will be transferred.”  App. at 404.  He went on to state that 
transfers would be effective on January 7 or 8 “unless [the 
                                              
2 The majority distinguishes its holding from Kalama by 
concluding that our Circuit’s precedent demands a different 
result.  However, the decisions cited by the majority are 
distinguishable from this case because, here, the shipowners 
did not actively litigate the merits of their cases.  Post at § 
II(B). 
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defendants], by announcing to the court in the filing of [their] 
answers on January 5th,” waived jurisdiction3.  App. at 404.   
To reverse the MDL Court’s finding that filing an 
answer did not necessarily amount to a waiver, we must hold 
that this finding was a “clearly erroneous finding of fact,” 
lacking support in the record.  However neither Judge Lambros 
nor Special Master Martyn stated that a defendant could not 
both file an answer and preserve its jurisdictional defense.  
Instead, the court indicated that, to save defendants from 
having to make separate filings, defendants could inform the 
court of their desire to consent to its jurisdiction by filing 
answers.  On the other hand, if a defendant did not file an 
answer, the court stated that it would assume that the party 
desired for its case to be transferred.  These rulings leave room 
for a third option: to file an answer so that the case would not 
be automatically transferred, while also maintaining a 
jurisdictional defense and preserving the issue of dismissal for 
appellate review.4   
                                              
3 A reasonable interpretation of the phrase “by announcing” is 
that Judge Lambros expected answers to include an express 
waiver of jurisdiction, if that was the party’s desire. 
4 This option may have been particularly important as 
defendants did not receive notice of the intended transferee 
courts until December 29, though answers were due January 5.  
The majority states that the shipowners could have taken their 
chances with default judgment instead, but this suggestion 
imposes an unnecessary risk where the shipowners had the 
option to preserve their defense for appeal, as they did.  Cf. 
Neifeld, 438 F.3d at 429 n.13 (finding no waiver where a 
defendant asserted a jurisdictional defense alongside a 
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The language in the shipowners’ Master Answer No. 2 
unequivocally demonstrates the shipowners’ intention to 
exercise this third option.  For instance, the shipowners stated 
that “[e]ach defendant maintains that the transfers are contrary 
to law” and has filed a motion to certify the order of transfer 
for interlocutory appeal.  App. at 1133.  They further provided 
that “[b]y filing its answer, defendant specifically does not 
waive its defense of lack of personal jurisdiction or waive its 
objections to the propriety of the transfers.”  App. at 1133-34.   
The MDL Court’s factual findings were not “clearly 
erroneous” because the record contains sufficient evidence to 
support them.  See Agathos, 977 F.2d at 1504.  First, the district 
court could not have intended to remove defendants’ right to 
preserve their personal jurisdiction defense when filing an 
answer because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly 
permit this action. Second, the hearing transcripts and the 
language in the shipowners’ answers support the conclusion 
that filing an answer alone would not waive personal 
jurisdiction, reflecting the propriety of the MDL Court’s 
factual conclusions.   
B. The MDL Court Did Not Make a Misapplication of 
Law. 
The MDL Court correctly noted that a party can waive 
its personal jurisdiction defense by participating in the 
litigation and taking advantage of the forum.  App. at 51 (citing 
Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 
456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982)).  Applying this law, the majority 
concludes that the shipowners implicitly waived their 
jurisdictional defense through both their active participation in 
                                              
compulsory counterclaim because the party had no alternative 
but to assert the claim in that filing or waive it).  
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the litigation and their dilatoriness (or inactivity).  However, 
we must defer to the MDL Court’s factual findings when 
applying them to the law. 
The shipowners did not actively participate in litigation 
in the Northern District of Ohio.  As the merchant mariners 
note, a party might waive its personal jurisdiction defense 
where it “actually litigates the underlying merits or 
demonstrates a willingness to engage in extensive litigation in 
the forum.”  Appellants’ Br. at 19 (citing In re Tex. E. 
Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 
15 F.3d 1230, 1236 (3d Cir. 1994)).  In Transmission Corp., 
we held that a party waived its personal jurisdiction defense by 
actively litigating the action, including pursuing counterclaims 
and moving for summary judgment.  Id.  Likewise, in Bel-Ray, 
we held that a party may waive its personal jurisdiction defense 
if it seeks affirmative relief from the court.  Bel-Ray Co. v. 
Chemrite Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 1999).  There, 
defendants actively litigated motions for summary judgment 
and enjoinment against arbitration, and then, only after the 
court denied summary judgment, did they file affidavits in 
support of their personal jurisdiction defense. Id. at 444.  
Because of this participation, we concluded that defendants 
submitted themselves to the court’s jurisdiction.  Id.  
The majority concludes that the shipowners continued 
to actively litigate their cases in the Northern District of Ohio 
after filing their answers.  However, the only activity reflected 
in the record pertains directly to the issue of jurisdiction and 
transfer.  Participation related to jurisdictional issues does not 
reflect the merits-based litigation that this Court has required 
to find implicit waiver.  See Transmission Corp., 15 F.3d at 
1236; Bel-Ray, 181 F.3d at 443.  Unlike the parties in 
Transmission Corp. and Bel-Ray, the shipowners did not 
pursue counterclaims, seek summary judgment, move to 
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enjoin, or otherwise actively litigate the merits of the case.  
Instead, the shipowners’ filings and participation reflect the 
complexity of this matter’s jurisdictional issues, which 
ultimately led to the creation of an MDL.   
On the other hand, the majority concludes that the 
shipowners forfeited their defense to personal jurisdiction 
because they “fail[ed] to diligently pursue it in the Northern 
District of Ohio.”  Maj. Op. at § III(B).5  However, the record 
reflects that the case idled; the merchant mariners were not 
actively prosecuting these cases during this time period; and 
the shipowners were not delaying litigation or delinquent.  See 
Adams v. Trs. of the N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 
F.3d 863, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that dilatoriness 
can be shown through “extensive or repeated delay or 
delinquency” or by a plaintiff’s years-long failure to 
prosecute).  Once Judge Robreno activated the cases against 
the shipowners, they filed renewed motions to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction and began pursuing the issue now 
before this Court.  The shipowners’ behavior reflects diligence, 
not dilatoriness. 
III 
The MDL Court rested its factual conclusions in the 
record and properly applied those facts to the correct legal 
standard.  That its application of the law resulted in a different 
conclusion than the majority’s does not reflect an “abuse of 
discretion,” but the type of fair-minded disagreement upon 
which our judicial system is premised. Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent. I would affirm the ruling of the District Court. 
                                              
5 On appeal, the merchant mariners did not argue that the 
shipowners forfeited their personal jurisdiction defense due to 
dilatoriness. 
